Fact–value distinction

In Simon’s analysis of administrative decisions, factual premises concern how the world operates, while value premises express preferred ends. A practical decision combines judgments about consequences with judgments about which consequences to pursue. “Factual” does not mean certain: an estimate about consequences is still factual in this sense. (Chapter I, printed p. 4; Chapter III, printed pp. 55–57)¹

Uses and boundaries

Simon takes the conclusions of logical positivism as his starting point. His fundamental premise is that ethical terms are not completely reducible to factual terms. This is his stated framework, not a consensus among ethical theories; within it, value premises cannot be empirically tested as correct or incorrect. His distinction also does not make administration value-free: the choice of goals remains part of a decision. (Chapter III, printed pp. 55–57)¹

The relation to Decision premises is a distinction between kinds of premises. An empirical prediction that an action raises a score does not by itself establish that raising that score ought to take precedence over other goals. Conversely, preferring an outcome does not establish that a proposed action will cause it.

Operational example

For an illustrative travel assistant, “this itinerary costs less” is a factual claim to verify; “cost matters more than travel time” is a preference to obtain or make explicit. Keep estimates and preferences separate in the decision record, including uncertainty in the estimates. A better estimate cannot resolve an unspecified tradeoff on its own.

Footnotes

1. Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. Fourth edition. The Free Press, 1997. ISBN 9780684835822. Publisher edition. Inspected Chapter I, printed p. 4 (PDF p. 11), and Chapter III, printed pp. 55–57 (PDF pp. 36–37). The private scan uses two-page spreads. ↩ ↩²